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I. INTRODUCTION
Pennsylvania's rape law has been in a state of flux for many years.
This is due in large part to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's inability
to agree on a single definition of forcible compulsion, an element
which must be proven in all Pennsylvania rape cases.2 Recently, in
Pennsylvania v. Berkowitz, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court overturned
a defendant's rape conviction because the defendant did not apply
actual force and the victim, who said 'no' throughout the encounter,
did not physically resist.' In holding as it did, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ignored contemporary definitions of forcible
compulsion.' The holding also unacceptably limits a sexual offense
1. 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
' J.D. Candidate, Washington College of Law at The American University, 1996; BA.
Winthrop University, 1993. I would like to thank Professor Sharon Rush for her comments on
earlier drafts of this piece. I also wish to thank my mom and sister, both of whom continuously
support all of my goals and endeavors.
2. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (1993) (listing forcible compulsion as the first required
element of rape).
3. Beraowitz, 641 A.2d at 1165.
4. See In the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (NJ. 1992) (holding that sexual
assault consists of any act of sexual penetration performed without affirmative and voluntary
consent to the act itself. In the absence of such consent, the act of sexual penetration becomes
unlawful and no additional physical force is required.); see also California v. Iniguez, 872 P.2d
1183 (Cal. 1994) (holding that resistance is no longer required to prove force or fear of force
and noting that it is unacceptably speculative to assert that the defendant would have abandoned
his attack had the victim resisted by screaming); DonnaJ. Case, Condom or Not, Rape is Rape:
Rape Law in the Era of AIDS-Does Condom Use Constitute Consent, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 227
(1993) (discussing forcible compulsion as a minimal amount of actual or constructive force);
Lani Ann Remick, Comment, Read Her Lips: An Argument for a Verbal Consent Standard in Rape,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1103 (1993) (asserting that a rape victim's verbal consent or non-consent is
the proper standard for rape as it is the standard applied to victims of other crimes).
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statute5 that eliminates any requirement that rape victims resist and
virtually overturns the court's own recent precedent expanding the
definition of forcible compulsion to include non-physical coercion.'
This note evaluates the Berkowitz definition of forcible compulsion,
7
and analyzes the decision's impact on Pennsylvania's rape cases.
8
Section two examines current statutory provisions and reviews
Pennsylvania's most decisive and varying opinions defining forcible
compulsion. Section three describes the sexual encounter between
the victim and defendant in Berkowitz and reviews the Superior and
Supreme Courts' decisions in terms of Pennsylvania's prior case law.
Section four describes the legislative response to Berkowitz and
evaluates proposed modifications of Pennsylvania's rape statute.
Section five concludes by condemning the Berkowitz decision as
inconsistent with Pennsylvania's prior case law, but also asserts that
there is hope for Pennsylvania, if not in the courts, then in the
legislature.
1H. PRIOR HISTORY
A. Statutory Provisions
Pennsylvania defines rape as a first degree felony committed by one
who has "sexual intercourse with another person not his spouse:9
(1) by forcible compulsion,
(2) by threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance
by a person of reasonable resolution,
(3) who is unconscious, or
(4) who is so mentally deranged or deficient that such person is
incapable of consent." 0
5. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (1983) (stating that rape victims do not need to
physically resist their attackers); see also Remick, supra note 4 (defining forcible compulsion as
the use of threats or force sufficient to dissuade a reasonable person from resisting).
6. Pennsylvania v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1225-26 (Pa. 1986) (holding that forcible
compulsion connotes more than physical force and includes moral, intellectual and
psychological coercion).
7. Pennsylvania v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1164 (Pa. 1994) (holding that forcible
compulsion requires something more than verbal resistance to show that the victim's will was
overborne).
8. See Cheryl Siskin, Ciminal Law--No. The "Resistance Not Required"Statute and "Rape Shield
Law" May Not Be Enough-Pennsylvania v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Super. Ct.) (Per
Curiam), Alloc. Granted, 613 A.2d 556 (Pa. 1992), 66 TEMP. L. REV. 531 (1993) (discussing the
Superior Court's definition of forcible compulsion and application of Pennsylvania's rape shield
law).
9. Contra 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3128 (1983 & Supp. 1995) (making it a second degree
felony to have sexual intercourse with one's spouse under any of the conditions [1-4] listed in
§ 3121).
10. Id § 3121(1)-(4).
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Pennsylvania supplements its definition of rape with a statute
entitled "Resistance Not Required," which states that "the alleged
victim need not resist the actor in prosecutions under this chapter:
Provided, however, that nothing in this section shall be construed to
prohibit a defendant from introducing evidence that the alleged
victim consented to the conduct in question.""
The forcible compulsion requirement makes Pennsylvania's current
rape statute less effective than it could be at deterring rapists.
Traditionally, forcible compulsion has been proven with evidence of
the victim's resistance. 2 By eliminating the resistance requirement,
but maintaining the forcible compulsion requirement, the legislature
has left Pennsylvania's courts to redefine forcible compulsion without
the aid of their traditional measuring stick, resistance."' The
absence of a consistently applied definition of forcible compulsion is
most notable in cases where the defendant does not leave the victim
with objectively verifiable evidence of force, like the marks of a
struggle.
14
B. Evolution of the Force Requirement
In 1978, a defendant argued that his rape conviction should be
overturned because his acquittal on an aggravated assault charge
precluded any finding of forcible compulsion. 5 The Pennsylvania
Superior Court rejected this argument, holding that lack of consent
is sufficient to support a rape conviction if the victim was induced by
threats or force to submit without physical resistance.' 6 The court
further held that the sufficiency of the force should not be measured
11. Id § 3107. But see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (Supp. 1983) (restating the 1972
Official Comment restricting rape to "'classic' rape cases, i.e., where the woman is subdued by
violence or threat of violence").
12. See Pennsylvania v. Moskorison, 85 A.2d 644,646 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952) (presuming the
victim's resistance is the measure of defendant's force);John Dwight Ingram, DateRape: It's Time
for "No" to Really Mean "No", 21 AM.J. CMI. L. 3, 16 (1993) (asserting that "'without her consent'
has usually been considered synonymous with 'by force'; 'force' required physical resistance by
the woman, and usually resulted in physical injury").
13. See Pennsylvania v. linarich, 542 A.2d 1335, 1339-40 (Pa. 1988) (grappling with the
definition of forcible compulsion); Pennsylvania v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1224-25 (Pa. 1986)
(defining forcible compulsion).
14. See Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1342 (overturning the defendant's rape conviction because,
absent evidence that she was beaten, the victim "chose" to submit to sexual intercourse rather
than resist); cf SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 6, 60 (1987) (asserting that force and resistance
requirements serve to protect the acquaintance rapist more than the stranger rapist since the
acquaintance rapist is not apt to use traditional implementations of force such as guns or
knives).
15. Pennsylvania v. Irvin, 393 A.2d 1042, 1044 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
16. Mot (citing Pennsylvania v. Moskorison, 85 A.2d 644,646 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1952) as stating
that aggravated assault consists of recklessly, intentionally, or knowingly attempting or causing
serious bodily injury under conditions evincing extreme indifference to the value of human life).
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against the victim's physical resistance; rather, the sufficiency of the
force should be measured against the effect it has on the victim's
will.17  Although Pennsylvania courts continue to cite this stan-
dard," it is difficult to apply and has required numerous expansions
and revisions. 9
In the 1982 case of Pennsylvania v. Williams, 21 Pennsylvania
expanded its definition of forcible compulsion. The victim in Williams
was waiting for a bus at the station when she accepted a ride from the
defendant 2' Instead of driving to the victim's destination, the
defendant drove to a dark, secluded area.2 He told the victim he
wanted "a little sex," twice threatened to kill her and kept one hand
in his pocket leading her to believe he was armed.23 The victim told
the defendant that if he was going to rape her, "to go ahead" because
she did not want to be hurt.24 After the victim submitted to oral sex
and sexual intercourse with the defendant, he returned her to the bus
station where she contacted the police.'
The Pennsylvania Superior Court found that murder threats were
sufficient to sustain the defendant's rape conviction 26 and stated:
It is not necessary that the victim be beaten, that the victim cry, that
the victim become hysterical, or that she be threatened by a weapon
for the crime of rape to occur. The degree of force required to
constitute rape is relative and depends on the facts and particular
circumstances of each caseY
Because each assessment of forcible compulsion is relative, Pennsylva-
nia's courts have reached contradictory results.28
17. Id.
18. See Pennsylvania v. Titus, 556 A.2d 425, 427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that the
standard for rape is whether the attacker's threats or force overpower the victim's will and would
overcome a reasonable person's will); Pennsylvania v. Dorman, 547 A.2d 757, 759 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (affirming that the rape standard is the effect the threat or force has on the victim's
will and the effect it would have on a reasonable person); Pennsylvania v. Poindexter, 539 A.2d
1341, 1344 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that the standard for rape also applies to involuntary
deviant sexual intercourse).
19. Compare Pennsylvania v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986) (broadening the definition
of forcible compulsion to include the use of moral, intellectual, or psychological force) with
Pennsylvania v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988) (holding that the victim chose to submit
to sexual intercourse with the defendant and that the psychological force applied was not
sufficient to overpower her will or constitute forcible compulsion).
20. 439 A.2d 765 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
21. Id. at 767.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 767 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
26. Id. at 768.
27. Id.
28. Compare Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226 uwth Mlinaich, 542 A.2d at 1336 (upholding Rhodes'
conviction but overturning Mlinarich's where both victims were young girls who knew their
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In 1986, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expanded the definition
of forcible compulsion to include non-physical coercion.29 In
Pennsylvania v. Rhodes, the defendant led his eight year old neighbor
to an abandoned building where he told her to lie on the floor and
pull up her legs.30 She complied and the defendant had anal and
vaginal intercourse with her.3'
The trial court found the defendant guilty of rape, 2 but the
Superior Court reversed the conviction for lack of evidence of forcible
compulsion.3 The Supreme Court reinstated the rape conviction
holding that forcible compulsion existed because the victim's young
age rendered her incapable of consenting to the sex acts with the
defendant.'
Justice Larsen, writing for the Rhodes majority, commented
extensively on the meaning of forcible compulsion. 5 Justice Larsen
noted that while Pennsylvania's current rape statute is based on the
Model Penal Code (MPC),8 Pennsylvania rejected the MPC's three-
tiered felony structure" in favor of one crime, first degree felony
rape.m The one-tiered structure Justice Larsen describes39 does not
exist in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania has two degrees of felony rape.
First degree rape applies to prosecutions under Title 18, section 3121
of the Pennsylvania Code, governing non-spousal rape, and second
attackers).
29. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226.
30. Il at 1218.
31. Id. at 1218-19.
32. Id. at 1219 (stating that the trial court also found the defendant guilty of statutory rape,
involuntary deviant sexual intercourse, indecent assault, indecent exposure, and corruption of
minors. The Superior and Supreme Courts did not disturb these convictions.).
33. Pennsylvania v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1219-20 (Pa. 1986) (citing the absence of
violence by the defendant, the lack of injury to the victim and the victim's state of consciousness
during the attack as support for the contention that the defendant did not forcibly compel the
victim to submit to sexual intercourse).
34. Id. at 1220 (expanding the definition of forcible compulsion to include situations
lacking force or threat of force where the victim is deemed legally incapable of consent).
35. Id. at 1221-27 (describing forcible compulsion as the use of superior force, which
includes superior physical, intellectual, moral, or psychological abilities).
36. Id, at 1221-24 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
37. PENAL CODE § 213.1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (creating two degrees of rape and
a third category called gross sexual imposition).
38. Pennsylvania v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1224 (Pa. 1986) (asserting that Pennsylvania's
one category of rape ensures that the crime always merits harsh punishment while the three-
tiered structure envisioned by the MODEL PENAL CODE allows lesser degrees of rape to be treated
less severely).
39. Id. (asserting that Pennsylvania's rape statutes are broader than the MODEL PENAL
CODE's provisions).
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degree rape applies to prosecutions under section 3128, spousal
rape.4°
The Rhodes court asserted that Pennsylvania's statutory requirement
of forcible compulsion is broader than the MPC's similar require-
ment 41 The court claims this is because the MPC focuses primarily
on physical force and violence, while Pennsylvania's statute does
not-' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court criticized the Superior
Court for limiting forcible compulsion to "sheer physical force or
physical violence."' The Supreme Court held that forcible compul-
sion connotes more than physical force and includes moral, intellectu-
al and psychological coercion.'
The Rhodes court noted that Pennsylvania has long evaluated force
in terms of the effect it produces on the victim's will.45 The fact-
finder should measure the reasonableness of the victim's abandon-
ment of her will by the totality of the circumstances. 8 Relevant
factors include, but are not limited to, the following:
a. age of the victim;
b. mental and physical condition of the victim and the defendant;
c. atmosphere and physical setting wherein the alleged rape
occurred;
d. defendant's authoritative position over the victim, if any; and
e. victim's duress.4'
The Rhodes decision turned primarily on the first of these factors, the
victim's age.'
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Nix pointed out that the
majority did not need to address the issue of forcible compulsion.49
The defendant's appeal was premised not on lack of evidence of
40. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3121, 3128 (1993) (creatinga first degree felony for forcible
rape and a second degree felony for spousal rape); see also Pa. H.B. 160, Pa. 175th General
Assembly, 1993-94 Regular Session (creating a two-tiered felony structure for rape).
41. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1224.
42. Id. But seePennsylvania v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335,1338 (rejecting the contention that
"'forcible compulsion' was intended by the General Assembly... to be extended to embrace
appeals to the intellect or morals of the victim"). This rejection effectively defiesJustice Larsen's
assertion that Pennsylvania's rape statute is broader than the MPC's. Id.
43. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1225.
44. Id. at 1225-26.
45. Id. at 1226 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Irvin, 393 A.2d 1042, 1044 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)).
46. Pennsylvania v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986); see infra note 62 and
accompanying text (recounting the Mlinarich court's assertion that forcible compulsion is not
present unless the victim acted reasonably in submitting to the defendant's actual or threatened
force).
47. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226 (stating that the forcible compulsion determination is fact-
specific).
48. Id. at 1220 (stating that the victim's young age rendered her mentally deficient and
legally incapable of consent).
49. Id. at 1232 (Nix, CJ., concurring).
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forcible compulsion, but on the victim's inconsistent statements.50
Since the defendant failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence
of forcible compulsion, the court should have limited its review to the
issue the defendant did raise."'
Chief Justice Nix reevaluated the meaning of forcible compulsion
just two years later in Pennsylvania v. Mlinaich.52  In Mlinarich, the
fourteen year old victim had just been released from a detention
home when she moved in with the sixty-three year old defendant and
his wife.53 The victim's biological family lived on the same street as
the defendant and consented to this living arrangement.54 The
defendant coerced the victim into performing oral sex on two
occasions, raped her once, and attempted to rape her on two other
occasions.55 At each encounter, the victim resisted the defendant by
crying, "screaming and hollering," and asking him to stop.56 The
defendant countered the victim's resistance by threatening to send
her back to the detention home if she did not comply with his
demands.5
Ajury convicted the defendant of rape, attempted rape, involuntary
deviant sexual intercourse, and corrupting the morals of a child.5"
The convictions for rape and attempted rape were reversed by the
Superior Court, which interpreted forcible compulsion to mean
physical violence or compulsion and not psychological duress. 9 In
reviewing the Superior Court's reversal of the defendant's rape
conviction, the Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the force
50. Id. at 1220 n.3 (upholding the Superior Court's rejection of the defendant's argument
that the victim's inconsistent statements to police regarding the place of the attack provided
insufficient and unreliable evidence).
51. IM. at 1232 (Nix, C.J., concurring) (citing Consumer Party v. Pennsylvania, 507A.2d 323
(Pa. 1986) (proposing that a reviewing court should exercise judicial restraint and address only
the issues raised by the parties)). But see Pennsylvania v. Titus, 556 A.2d 425 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989) and Pennsylvania v. Dorman, 547 A.2d 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding that Rhodes'
definition of forcible compulsion is binding, but not addressing whether the factors to be
considered in evaluating forcible compulsion are dicta).
52. 542 A.2d 1335, 1349 (Pa. 1988).
53. Id. at 1337 (stating that the defendant's wife suggested this living arangement).
54. Id.
55. Id. (resulting in convictions for attempted rape, involuntary deviant sexual intercourse,
corrupting the morals of a minor, indecent exposure, and endangering the welfare of a minor).
The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court in vacating the convictions for endangering
the welfare of a minor and indecent exposure, reversing the rape and attempted rape
convictions, and affirming the involuntary deviant sexual intercourse and corrupting the morals
of a minor charges. Id.
56. Pennsylvania v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d, 1335, 1343 (Pa. 1988) (Larsen, J., dissenting).
57. Id (LarsenJ., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1342.
59. Pennsylvania v. Mlinarich, 498 A.2d 395,401 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that threats
to return the victim to a detention center do not constitute forcible compulsion necessary to
sustain a conviction for rape).
173
174 JOURNAL OF GENDER & THE LAW [Vol. 4:167
used (defendant's threats to return the victim to the detention home)
was sufficient to overcome a reasonable person's will.' The Su-
preme Court held the victim to a reasonable adult standard reasoning
that the legislature deemed people fourteen years of age or older
capable of consent and thus not entitled to protection as a minor.
61
The Supreme Court stated:
The critical distinction is where the compulsion overwhelms the
will of the victim in contrast to a situation where the victim can
make a deliberate choice to avoid the encounter even though the
alternative may be an undesirable one.
... The purpose of the term [forcible compulsion] was to
distinguish between an assault upon the will and the forcing of the
victim to make a choice regardless of how repugnant. The fact
cannot be escaped that the victim made the choice and the act is
not involuntary.6 2
An equally divided Supreme Court upheld the Superior Court's
reversal of the defendant's rape conviction for lack of evidence of
forcible compulsion.63
In holding as it did, the Mlinarich court ignored the precedent
established by Williams,' Rhodes,' and the elimination of the
resistance requirement by Titie 18, section 3107 of the Pennsylvania
Code.66 Although the court paid lip service to the no resistance
requirement by tracing its development in the law and affirming it as
the present standard,' the holding makes clear that resistance is
60. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1341.
61. Id. at 1339 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3122 (1993) which creates a second degree
felony for sexual intercourse with a person under the age of fourteen even if the under-aged
person consents).
62. Id. at 1342.
63. Id. at 1336 (holding that forcible compulsion encompasses pyschological duress but does
not appeal to a victim's intelligence or morals). The key element is that the act must be against
the victim's will. The court found the present case lacked psychological duress because the
victim engaged in rational calculation and reluctantly chose to submit. Id.
64. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (upholding the
defendant's rape conviction despite the fact that the victim "chose" to submit to non-consensual
sexual intercourse to avoid being beaten or killed).
65. Pennsylvania v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1227 (Pa. 1986) (stating that forcible
compulsion exists by virtue of the adult's greater size, age, psychological and emotional maturity,
and sophistication where the adult instructs the child to submit to sexual acts, especially if the
child knows and trusts the adult); see Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1349 (Larsen,J., dissenting) ("The
Opinion in Support of Affirmance does not attempt to distinguish Rhodes , nor does it attempt
to explain in any way why [Rhodes] is not controlling.").
66. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (asserting that the statute eliminating a
requirement that victims resist is ineffective, especially as applied in cases of acquaintance rape).
67. Pennsylvania v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335, 1341 (Pa. 1988).
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required.' The court's holding indicates that anytime a victim fails
to resist such failure can be deemed her choice.69 If her options are
resist or submit, and she submits, then submission was her choice and,
as such, a voluntary act despite the threats of force.7"
The Mlinarich holding is also problematic because the victim's
submission to non-consensual sexual intercourse is evaluated in terms
of a reasonable person's resolve.7 The Mlinarich court stated that
the unique aspects of the victim's emotional nature are not consider-
ations when determining whether the threat constitutes forcible
compulsion.72 The proper test is the reaction the threat would
produce in a reasonable person.' If the defendant's actions would
not have compelled a reasonable person to submit, then the victim's
choice to submit will be deemed voluntary and consensual.74 The
Mlinarich opinion contradicts Pennsylvania's prior precedents because
it requires an objective evaluation 5 of the defendant's force while
Rhodes,76 Williams,77 and Irvin78 support more subjective analyses.
68. I& at 1342; see also Pennsylvania v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1348 n.7 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (per curiam) (stating that the no resistance requirement can only be applied in cases
where forcible compulsion is found). This means a rape victim may feel forcibly compelled and
therefore not resist. If a court deems her feeling unreasonable or finds that no forcible
compulsion was present, the resistance not required statute will be deemed inapplicable. This
conclusion affords the defendant unnecessary protection. If rape requires forcible compulsion
and the court finds there was no forcible compulsion because the victim's subjective beliefs were
unreasonable, then there can be no rape conviction. This limitation of the resistance not
required statute reflects the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's continuing use of the victim's
resistance as the guide in determining if the defendant used sufficient forcible compulsion. Id
69. See ESTRICH, supra note 14, at 63 (stating "the conclusion that no force is present
emerges not as ajudgment that the man acted reasonably, but as ajudgment that the woman
victim did not.").
70. Pennsylvania v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335,1342 (Pa. 1988); seeDana Berliner, Rethinking
the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE LJ. 2687, 2692 (1991) (arguing that resistance
continues to be used by courts in evaluating force and consent despite the abolition in many
states of a resistance requirement).
71. Mlinaich, 542 A.2d at 1340; see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(2) (1983 & Supp. 1995)
(utilizing a reasonable person standard directly in the rape statute). But see Pennsylvania v.
Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (stating the amount of force necessary for
rape is relative and fact-specific).
72. Mlinardh, 542 A.2d at 1340.
73. Id
74. See ESTRICH, supra note 14, at 71 (arguing that the focus is on the victim, rather than
the attacker, and how she measures up to the court's preconceived notion of a reasonable
woman); Remick, supra note 4, at 1104 (asserting that our patriarchal society accepts limited
amounts of coercion and violence against women as a normal aspect of sexual experience and
encourages male aggression).
75. Mlinarch, 542 A.2d at 1340; see Morrison Torrey, When Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths
and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1055 (1991) (citing
Carol BohmerJudicialAttitudes Toward Rape Victims, in FORCIBLE RAPE: THE GRIME, THEVICTIM,
AND THE OFFENDER, 161, 161-62 (1977) as showing that Philadelphia judges bear the same
prejudice toward rape victims as society at large, thus precluding objective evaluation).
76. 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (stating that degree of force required depends on the
facts of each case).
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The reasonableness requirement is problematic for at least three
reasons. First, men and women have different perceptions of
reasonableness. 79 Second, if the defendant has a history of physically
abusing the victim, such history may lead the victim to submit despite
the absence of imminent threatened or actual force.80 A court, far
removed from the circumstances, may deem the parties' history
irrelevant and find the victim's submission unreasonable.8 ' Thus, a
defendant may create a situation designed to intimidate his victim
into submission and still be acquitted of rape. 2 Finally, requiring a
rape victim to act as a reasonable adult8 3 presumes that the trauma
inherent in rape is not sufficient to justify a less exacting standard.'
In affirming the reversal of Mlinarich's conviction, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court ignored several factors which Rhodes indicates are
relevant in identifying moral, psychological or intellectual coercion.
8 5
First, there was a wide age disparity between the fourteen year old
77. 439 A.2d 765, 768 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (stating that degree of force is relative and
sufficiency depends on the facts and circumstances of each case).
78. 393 A.2d 1042, 1044 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (holding that the requisite degree of force
is defined in terms of the effect it has on the victim's volition, as distinguished from a
reasonable victim's volition).
79. SeeESTRICH, supra note 14, at 22 (reporting that men believe the less resistance, the less
serious the rape while women believe to the contrary and more readily identify with the victim);
Torrey, supra note 75, at 1039 (citing Nona J. Barnett and Hubert S. Field, Sex Differences in
University Students' Attitudes Toward Rape, J.C. STUDENT PERSONNEL, March, 1977 at 93, 94, as
showing that 40% of women but only 18% of men thought rape was an exercise of male power
over females).
80. See North Carolina v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 471, 474-75 (N.C. 1984) (holding that
previous domestic violence does not constitute threatened force); cf. Susan Murphy, Assisting the
Jury in Understanding Wctimization Expert Psychological Testimony on Battered Woman Syndrome and
Rape Trauma Syndrome, 25 COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROas. 227 (1992) (discussing the psychological
effects of rape and domestic violence on women and asserting that legal standards inadequately
reflect the experiences of women).
81. Alston, 312 S.E.2d at 475 (holding that evidence of the victim's past experience with
defendant's violent behavior was irrelevant).
82. See Pennsylvania v. Biggs, 467 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (reversing the defendant
father's rape conviction for lack of forcible compulsion where the father blackmailed his
daughter and quoted the Bible to her to secure her submission); see also, ESTRICH supra note 14,
at 35-36, 67 (discussing Bigs and criticizing courts for refusing to recognize "force as the power
that a defendant need not use").
83. See Pierre Thomas, Rape of Girls Is Common, Study Finds Half of all Victims are Under Age
18, WASH. POST, June 23, 1994, at Al (citing a 1992 study, in which Pennsylvania participated,
which found that half of all rape victims were under 18).
84. Cf Lynn Hecht Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the Myth of the
Nonviolent RapiA 20 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 439 (1993) (stating that "victims of nonstranger rape
often experience even more severe and long lasting psychological trauma than the victims of
strangers because they experience more self and societal blame for failing to prevent the rape")
(citing Sally I. Bowie et al., Blitz Rape and Confdence Rape: Implications for Clinical Intervention, 64
Am.J. OF PSYCHOTHERAP 180 (1990)).
85. Pennsylvania v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335, 1342 (Pa. 1988) (citing Rhodes but failing to
discuss any of the factors relevant to establishing mental coercion, such as the ages and mental
and physical attributes of the persons, location of incident, position of authority or custody held
by accused, and whether the victim was under duress).
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victim and sixty-three year old defendant . 6 Second, the atmosphere
and physical setting worked to the defendant's advantage because the
victim lived in a home which was not her family's and in which she
was often alone with the defendant.8 7 Third, the victim's mental
state was not as "reasonable" as it could have been because she had
just been released from her first stay in a detention home.' Finally,
the defendant enjoyed a position of authority over the victim because
she was subject to the defendant's supervision when his wife was
away 9 and the defendant served as the victim's surrogate father.9"
In his dissenting opinionJustice Larsen wrote, "if Mlinarich's conduct
here did not constitute 'psychological duress' which overwhelmed the
will of the victim, then I doubt that any conduct could."9'
In addition to contradicting Rhodes,92 the Mlinarich opinion
contradicts itself. Despite reciting the "resistance not required"
standard, the Mlinarich court held that a rape conviction could not be
supported absent evidence that the victim's will had been over-
borne.93 The court stated that the word 'forceful' was employed to
prevent rape convictions where there was no assault upon the will. 4
Thus, Mlinarich holds that force must be applied to the victim's will,
that the victim need not resist this force, but that there must be some
proof the victim's will was overborne.95 Therefore, if the defendant
does not apply force other than penetration and the victim does not
offer more than verbal resistance, then the defendant cannot be
convicted of rape in Pennsylvania.
86. Id. at 1337.
87. Id
88. Id. at 1343 (Larsen,J., dissenting) (implying that the victim was particularly vulnerable
to threats of being returned to the detention home).
89. Id.
90. Pennsylvania v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335, 1345 (Pa. 1988) (Larsen, J., dissenting)
(describing the defendant as the victim's "custodial supervisor").
91. Id. at 1344 (advocating reversing the Superior Court and reinstating defendant's
conviction); see also ESTMCH supra note 14, at 70 (arguing that after Mlinarich, forcible
compulsion replaced non-consent as the key element of Pennsylvania's rape statute).
92. 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986).
93. Mlinarid 542 A.2d at 1341.
94. Id.
95. See ESTI-CH supra note 14, at 69 (asserting that a similar contradiction occurred in
North Carolina v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984), where the victim submitted to sexual
intercourse with the defendant who had a habit of beating her when she refused his demands).
In Aiston, the victim's fear of a beating, in the absence of an explicit threat or actual beating,
but despite the parties' history, was not sufficient evidence of forcible compulsion. A/ston, 312
S.E.2d at 476.
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Pennsylvania v. Dorman96 and Pennsylvania v. TituS 7 both address
the tension between Rhodes?' and Mlinarich.99  Rhodes holds that
forcible compulsion is broader than "sheer physical force or physical
violence" °0 while Mlinarich limits forcible compulsion to "physical
compulsion or violence."10' Titus and Dorman both hold that Rhodes
governs. 0
2
In Dorman, the thirty-eight year old defendant took his thirteen year
old niece for a ride.0 3 Instead of driving to her destination, the
defendant drove down a dirt road to a secluded area." He parked
the car, moved closer to his niece, and began fondling her.' The
niece said "don't" but the defendant proceeded to disrobe them both
and have sexual intercourse with her. 6 No conversation occurred
during the sexual encounter other than the niece's original remark,
"don't1 07
The defendant was convicted of rape and appealed, arguing that
the victim's one utterance, "don't," failed to establish actual or
threatened physical compulsion."0 In evaluating the defendant's
claim, the Superior Court agreed with the Rhodes court and held that
the degree of force required to support a rape conviction varied
according to the facts and circumstances of each case."° The
Dorman court also noted that:
the courts of Pennsylvania have not always agreed on the amount
of force necessary to support a finding that the victim was forcibly
compelled to submit to intercourse. The case law dealing with the
element of forcible compulsion or threat thereof has been in a
constant state of flux. °
96. 547 A.2d 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
97. 556 A.2d 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
98. 510 A.2d at 1217 (Pa. 1986).
99. 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988).
100. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1225, n.12.
101. M/inaich, 542 A.2d at 1342.
102. Titus, 556 A.2d at 428 n.2; Dorman, 547 A.2d at 761; see also Be*owitz, 609 A.2d at 1344
nA (holding that Minarich is non-binding precedent because it was decided by a plurality while
Rhodes was decided by a majority) (citing Pennsylvania v. Ruppert, 579 A.2d 966, 969 n.6 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990)).
103. Dorman, 547 A.2d at 757.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 757-58, 761.
106. 1d. at 758, 761.
107. Id. at 758.
108. Dorman, 547 A.2d at 758 (indicating that the defendant was also convicted of statutory
rape, corruption of minors, and indecent assault, all of which were affirmed).
109. Dorman, 547 A.2d at 758 (citing Pennsylvania v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1982)).
110. Id.
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The Dorman court followed Rhodes instead of Mlinarich because the
affirmance in Mlinarich was the product of an equally divided
Supreme Court. As such, the Mlinarich decision merits persuasive
rather than precedential authority."2
The Superior Court upheld Dorman's conviction after finding the
following Rhodes factors"' present:
a. the physical setting was remote;
b. a tventy-five year age difference existed between the victim and
the defendant; and
c. the defendant enjoyed a position of authority over the victim by
virtue of their uncle/niece relationship."'
Pennsylvania v. Titus also addresses the tension between Rhodes"5
and Mlinarich."6 In Titus, the thirteen year old victim moved from
her mother's home in Florida to live with her father and
grandparents in Pennsylvania."' Within one month of her arrival,
the victim's father came home drunk, crawled into bed with her, woke
her up, and had sexual intercourse with her."' The victim did not
consent to having sexual intercourse with her father.'19 The court's
opinion, however, stresses that she did not push him away until after
the intercourse occurred.1
20
Despite following Rhodes and construing forcible compulsion more
broadly, the court reversed Titus' rape conviction.' 21  The court
justified its holding by noting that the defendant had not threatened
the victim, she was not in a remote or unfamiliar place, and the
record was devoid of any evidence that the defendant had previously
111. Id. at 761.
112. Id.
113. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (delineating factors bearing on the
reasonableness of the victim's abandonment of her will).
114. Dorman, 547A.2d at 761-62. But seePennsylvaniav. Ables, 590 A.2d 334, 338 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1991) (holding that an uncle/niece relationship does not establish forcible compulsion);
Pennsylvania v. Titus, 556 A.2d 425, 429 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that a parent/child
relationship alone will not establish moral, psychological or intellectual coercion because to so
hold would criminalize every act of sex between father and minor daughter where the daughter
testifies she did not consent).
115. 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986).
116. 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988).
117. Titus, 556 A.2d at 426.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 426-27; f. ESTRICH, supra note 14, at 32 (asking sarcastically, in relation to
another case, whether it is reasonable to believe, as the court apparently does, that she wanted
to have sex with her father).
121. Titus, 556 A.2d at 430 (upholding the defendant's convictions of statutory rape,
corruption of minors, incest, indecent assault, indecent exposure, and endangering the welfare
of children).
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abused the victim. 2 The court recognized that a father normally
enjoys a position of authority over his childs but held the existence
of a parent-child relationship was not sufficient to establish forcible
compulsion. 124  In an attempt to distinguish Dorman," the
TitUS'26 court stated that Dorman pushed his niece and this consti-
tuted actual physical force which was lacking in Titus.'27
Although Rhodes2s was supposedly determinative on questions of
forcible compulsion, the Supreme Court accepted Berkowitz29 in yet
another attempt to define forcible compulsion.
III. THE BERKowlTz FACTS
A. The Rape
In 1988, the victim and defendant were both sophomores at East
Stroudsburg State University in Pennsylvania.' At the time of the
incident, the defendant was twenty years old and the victim was
nineteen. 3' Shortly before the April 19, 1988 rape, both victim and
defendant attended a school seminar entitled "Does 'No' Sometimes
Mean 'Yes'?"' Among other things, the speaker, in an attempt to
lighten the students' moods, discussed penis sizes.'
33
Both victim and defendant testified that sometime after the seminar
they discussed the defendant's penis size." The victim described
a conversation which included herself, several of her friends, the
defendant and his roommate.13  The defendant asserted that an
additional communication occurred immediately after the seminar
which included the victim asking to see his penis.Y The defendant
122. Id at 429.
123. Id. at 429-30 (noting that because of the limited duration of this parent/child
relationship and the lack of information in the record concerning the intimacy of the
relationship, the court could not assume the usual parent/child relationship existed in this
case).
124. Id at 430.
125. 547 A.2d 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
126. 556 A.2d 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
127. Id. at 428; see Titus, 556 A.2d 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that since the
defendant had not threatened the victim and had no previous record of abusing her, there was
no physical force).
128. 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986).
129. 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
130. Pennsylvania v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338, 1339 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (per curiam).
131. Id
132. Id at 1340-41.
133. Telephone Interview with Sergeant Bogart, East Stroudsburg State University
Investigating Officer (July 13, 1994).
134. Be*ozit, 609 A.2d at 1340-41.
135. Id at 1341.
136. Id
[Vol. 4:167
Fall 1995] RAPE AND THE REQUIREMENT OF FORCE
claimed the victim visited his room intoxicated on two occasions
before the rape and laid on his bed with her legs spread asking to see
his penis.
3 7
On April 19, 1988, the victim attended two morning classes and
returned to her dormitory room."s She planned to meet her
boyfriend in the lounge of his dormitory.39 The couple quarreled
the evening before and the victim, in an effort to relax, drank a
martini before going to meet her boyfriend.14 °
The victim waited for her boyfriend for an unspecified amount of
time in his dormitory lounge.' 4' Then she went to search for her
friend, Earl, who lived with defendant Berkowitz in the same building
as the victim's boyfriend." She knocked on Earl's door, received
no answer, and decided to leave a note." She then knocked again
and still received no answer."44 She tried the door and, finding it
open, entered the room."
Once inside, the victim saw the defendant, whom she mistook as
her friend Earl, lying on the bed with a pillow covering his head."
The victim lifted the pillow and discovered that the person on the bed
was the defendant, not Earl. 47 The victim asked the defendant
which dresser belonged to Earl, the defendant pointed it out, and the
victim placed her note on Earl's dresser."
The defendant testified that he believed the victim wanted to have
sexual intercourse with him because she previously visited his room
and awakened him.49 The defendant asked the victim to stay for
a while and she agreed, 5 ° although she denied his requests to sit on
his bed and massage his back.' The victim sat on the floor and
137. Id; cf. Lynn Hecht Schafran, Wting & Reading About Rape: A Pimer, 66 ST. JOHN's L.
REV. 979, 992 (1993) (noting that many men presume women implicitly consent to sexual
intercourse by going to men's rooms).
138. Berkowtz, 609 A.2d at 1339.
139. 139.Id.
140. Id
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1339 (stating that the victim wrote a note which read, "hi Earl,
I'm drunk. That's not why I came to see you. I haven't seen you in a while. I'll talk to you
later, victim's name.").
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1340.
148. BerkowitZ, 609 A.2d at 1340.
149. Id. at 1341 (ignoring the possibility that each time the victim stopped by the defendant's
room her intent was to visit Earl).
150. Id. at 1340.
151. Id
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talked with the defendant about her troubled relationship with her
boyfriend.'52 The defendant moved to the floor and "straddled" the
victim.153 He began kissing her which prompted her to say that she
had to go meet her boyfriend. The defendant then began
fondling the victim's breasts at which point she said "no."'
55
The defendant, still straddling the victim, used his body weight to
press her back toward the floor to attempt to receive oral sex.56
The victim testified that at this point she "couldn't move because [the
defendant] was shifting his body at her so he was over her." 7
Although she did not physically resist, the victim continuously said
"no" and told the defendant she had to go.' She described her
tone as "scolding."159
Both victim and defendant stood up and, despite the victim's saying
she had to go, the defendant locked the door." The victim
testified that she knew the door could have been opened from the
inside.' Then, the defendant put the victim on the bed in a
manner described as somewhere in between "a fast shove" and a "slow
... romantic kind of thing."62 The defendant again straddled the
victim, untied her sweat pants, and removed her pants and undergar-
ments from one leg." The victim did not resist because she could
not move." She did not scream because she had emotionally
distanced herself from the situation.1'
The defendant used his hand to guide his penis into the victim's
vagina.1" After approximately thirty seconds, 67  he noticed a
"blank look on her face. " "lt He withdrew and ejaculated onto her
stomach. 69 The defendant said, "wow, I guess we just got carried
152. Id.
153. Berowutd, 609 A.2d at 1340.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id (quoting Tr. Sept. 14, 1988 at 34).
158. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340.
159. Id.
160. I&
161. Id. at n.2 (citing Tr. Sept. 14, 1988 at 61).
162. Id. at 1340 (quoting Tr. Sept. 14, 1988 at 39).
163. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340.
164. Id.
165. Id- (quoting the victim as stating that "it was like a dream was happening or
something"); cf. Schafran, supra note 137, at 990 (noting that rape victims often disassociate
their bodies from their minds during rape, as if it were a dream or they were watching it happen
to their bodies from the outside) (citing DIANE E.H. RUSSELL, THE POLMCS OF RAPE 19 (1974)).
166. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340.
167. Id.
168. Id at 1341.
169. Id. at 1340.
Fall 1995] RAPE AND THE REQUIREMENT OF FORCE
away" to which the victim responded, "no, we didn't get carried away,
you got carried away."I °
The victim adjusted her clothing, grabbed her books, and ran
downstairs. 1"' When she saw her boyfriend, she began to cry."72
They went up to his room where the victim cleaned the semen off of
her stomach and her boyfriend called the police. 7
B. The Trial and Appellate Courts
The jury in Berkowitz convicted the defendant of rape, a first degree
felony, and indecent assault, a second degree misdemeanor. 74 The
defendant was sentenced to one to four years for rape and six to
twelve months for indecent assault 175 The sentences were to run
concurrently. 7  The defendant appealed 177 prompting the Superi-
or Court's focus on the element of forcible compulsion and the Rape
Shield Law.' 78
The Pennsylvania Superior Court reviewed the evidence to
determine if forcible compulsion could be established under (1) the
Rhodes standard, 79 (2) 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(2),180 (3)
in terms of actual physical force,' or (4) as a result of the victim's
reiteration of the word "no" throughout the encounter.8 2  The
court held that the proof of forcible compulsion was insufficient to
sustain the defendant's rape conviction. 8 3
170. Id.
171. Berkouwit, 609 A.2d at 1340.
172. Id. at 1341.
173. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340.
174. Id. at 1341; see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3121, 3126 (1993) (defining rape and
indecent assault).
175. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1341-42.
176. Id.
177. d. (noting that the defendant was not incarcerated during the period between the jury
verdict and the appellate court's review of his conviction).
178. Id. at 1342; see Siskin, supra note 8, at 531-33 (discussing the Superior Court's review of
the Rape Shield Law). The Rape Shield Law provides that evidence of specific instances of the
alleged victim's past sexual conduct, and reputation of such conduct, shall not be admitted as
evidence in rape cases, unless such evidence relates to the alleged victim's past sexual conduct
with the alleged rapist. Siskin, supra note 8, at 532 n. 6.
179. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1343-45 (citing Pennsylvania v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa.
1986), "moral, psychological or intellectual force used to compel a person to engage in sexual
intercourse against that person's will").
180. Id. at 1343 ("threat of forcible compulsion that would prevent resistance by a person
of reasonable resolution.").
181. Id at 1345 (stating that the prosecution contended that the rape conviction was
supported by evidence of actual physical force used to complete the act of intercourse).
182. Id. at 1347.
183. Id. at 1348.
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1. The Rhodes Standard
The Superior Court held that the defendant's rape conviction could
not be upheld on the basis of Rhodes' "moral, psychological or
intellectual force" standard.1' Although the Rhodes opinion indicat-
ed that the factors it listed to help evaluate mental coercion were not
exclusive,"s the Superior Court in Berkowitz did not look beyond
those factors.186
Rhodes suggests that the ages and mental and physical conditions of
the parties are also important in evaluating the existence of moral,
psychological or intellectual force. 87 The Superior Court noted
that both parties were sophomores at the time of the incident and the
victim was only one year younger than the defendant"' The
Superior Court's evaluation of the victim's mental condition did not
include the effect of the victim's recent argument with her boyfriend
or the martini she had just consumed. 8 9
The Superior Court noted that the record did not disclose the
relative sizes of the parties yet found that there was no indication that
the parties differed physically or mentally from each other in any
material way."t The victim testified that the defendant used his
body to straddle her and push her back onto the floor in an attempt
to obtain oral sex.19' The victim testified that she "couldn't move"
because the defendant was "over her.""9 2 After putting the victim
onto the bed, the defendant again straddled her and she testified that
she "couldn't like go anywhere." 93 This inability to move is why the
victim did not resist."
The Superior Court did not deem the "atmosphere and physical
setting" coercive because the victim voluntarily entered the appellant's
184. Ber*owitz, 609 A.2d at 1344 (evidencing its reductionist attitude and unwillingness to
follow Rhodes, the court joins the three categories into one, mental coercion).
185. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226.
186. Beo*owit4. 609 A.2d at 1344; cf Robin L West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on
Beyond Rape 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1442, 1454 (1993) (providing factors other than those
enumerated in Rhodes to establish mental coercion). Women may submit to sexual intercourse
because they know other punishment. such as the withholding of food or money, or the physical
abuse of her or her children, will be utilized if they refuse to submit to unwanted sexual
intercourse. Id.
187. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226.
188. Berkoitz, 609 A.2d at 1344.
189. Id.
190. Id. (failing to explain how the absence of information leads to the conclusion that the
parties were of relatively equal size).
191. Id. at 1340.
192. Id. (quoting Tr. Sept. 14, 1988 at 34).
193. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1340.
194. Id.
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dorm room and stayed of her own volition. 95 The opinion does
not reflect any consideration of the effect of the defendant's actions
on the atmosphere,' 96 even though both parties agreed that the
victim said "no" throughout the encounter and the defendant locked
the door in response to the victim's assertion that she wanted to
leave. 9' By failing to discuss defendant's actions as they related to
physical setting and atmosphere, the court limited its review in a
manner inconsistent with Rhodes.9
The Superior Court held the defendant was "not in a position of
authority, domination or custodial control over the victim."199 The
victim testified, however, that the appellant ignored her repeated
"no's" and assertions that she had to go, and instead locked the
door.2" It is unclear whether the victim was consciously aware at
the time of the rape that she could open the locked door. °' It may
well be that the victim believed, and the defendant intended her to
believe, that he was in a position of domination and custodial control
when he locked the door.
20 2
The Superior Court paid little attention to the duress aspect of the
Rhodes standard,03 stating, "no record evidence indicates that the
victim was under duress."2' None of the facts of the case are
discussed to determine whether duress was present; in fact, the
elements of duress are not even delineated.0 5
195. Id. at 1344.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1340-41.
198. See Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226 (indicating that sufficiency determinations depend upon
the totality of the circumstances and are not limited to the factors delineated in the opinion).
199. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1344.
200. Id. at 1340.
201. See Bekouwtz, 609 A.2d at 1340 n. 2 (citing Tr. Sept. 14, 1988 at 61) (stating that the
victim later testified that she knew the door could have been opened from the inside).
202. Cf. ESTRICH, supra note 14, at 67 ("That a woman feels genuinely afraid, that a man has
created the situation she finds frightening, even that he has done it intentionally in order to
secure sexual satisfaction, is apparently not enough to constitute the necessary force or even
implicit threat of force.").
203. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226 (finding that aside from physical force, "moral, psychological
or intellectual force" may be used to compel an unwilling person to have sex).
204. Bkouditz, 609 A.2d at 1344.
205. Id, see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 309 (1983 & Supp. 1995) (defining duress as use or
threat of use of unlawful force that a reasonable person would not be able to resist). The use
of duress in rape cases merits an independent paper addressing issues such as what constitutes
unlawful force and should a rape victim be required to be reasonable. Perhaps such
complications are what led the Rhodes court to avoid addressing the issue.
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2. § 3121(2) Threat of Force
The Superior Court next considered whether the facts could
support a finding of forcible compulsion based on a threat of
force.0 A threat is sufficient forcible compulsion only if it will
prevent resistance by a person of reasonable resolve."° The victim
here testified that the defendant did not threaten her and the court
found the defendant did not implicitly threaten her."' Thus, the
court held no threat of force existed sufficient to sustain the
defendant's rape conviction."°
The Superior Court did not evaluate threat of forcible compulsion
in terms of Rhodes' additions to the definition of forcible compul-
21sion. 1 Since moral, psychological or intellectual coercion can
constitute forcible compulsion, threat of these elements should be
sufficient to sustain a rape conviction under the Pennsylvania Rape
Statute.211
Although the defendant did not specifically threaten the victim, he
certainly acted in a manner which could be deemed threatening. He
straddled her on two different occasions rendering her unable to
escape and locked the door when she said she needed to leave.2 1
2
In addition, the defendant only ceased having sexual intercourse with
the victim when he saw a "blank look" on her face.2 13  Although the
Superior Court's opinion attaches no significance to this fact,214 it
indicates, at least, that the victim was not an active participant. At
most, the victim's vacant stare indicates that the defendant used
sufficient forcible compulsion or the threat of it to obtain her submis-
sion without additional resistance. 215
206. Berkowit, 609 A.2d at 1344.
207. Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(2) (1983 & Supp. 1995)).
208. Id.
209. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1344-45 (citing Pennsylvania v. Poindexter, 539 A.2d at 1341 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1988) (finding that a father's reproaches and threats are sufficient to establish
coercion toward his daughter) and Pennsylvania v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)
(finding a threat that victim would be killed if she resisted sufficient to establish forcible
compulsion)).
210. Id. at 1340.
211. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(2) (1983 & Supp. 1995).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 1341.
214. Id.
215. See Pennsylvania v. Irvin, 393 A.2d 1042, 1044 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (holding that only
the force necessary to obtain submission without additional resistance is necessary to support a
rape conviction).
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As the foregoing analysis indicates, the defendant's actions can be
viewed as rendering the atmosphere and physical setting intimidat-
ing. 16 Similarly, the victim's recent argument with her boyfriend
over her alleged infidelity appears to have affected her mental
state. 17 The combination of these factors support a belief by the
victim that her refusal to submit to sexual intercourse with the
defendant would lead to more extreme moral, psychological, or
intellectual coercion. For example, the victim might have believed
that the defendant would tell her boyfriend she was sexually promis-
cuous, whether she had sex with him or not. As with actual force
where the victim should not be required to resist until the defendant
beats or kills her, the victim of mental coercion should not be
required to resist until the defendant utilizes his most damaging
tactics. The court's holding indicates an unwillingness to respect or
validate the victim's evaluation of the situation.
3. Actual Forcible Compulsion
In evaluating the evidence of actual forcible compulsion, the
Superior Court held that while injury to, or physical resistance by, the
victim were indicia of force," the absence of both resistance and
injury were not fatal to the Commonwealth's case. 9 The court
stated that absence of physical injury was "insignificant" in evaluating
the forcible compulsion requirement. 20 The court considered what
precise degree of actual physical force is sufficient to prove forcible
compulsion.
The court quoted pre-Rhodes cases222 as holding forcible compul-
sion exists whenever a woman is induced to submit without additional
resistance. 23  This standard dates back to at least 1952224 and, in
so far as it requires additional resistance, ignores the statutory mandate
216. See ESTIC supra note 14, at 32 (providing an alternative analysis of atmosphere and
physical setting).
217. Beraotz, 609 A.2d at 1339 (citing Tr. Sept. 14, 1988 at 24) (noting that the victim
drank a martini at mid-afternoon "to relax" before going to meet her boyfriend).
218. Beraowitz, 609 A.2d at 1345.
219. Id. (asserting that appellant's reliance on the absence of physical resistance or injury
is misplaced).
220. Id. (recognizing that rape is not defined by physical injury to the victim).
221. Id. at 1346.
222. See Berkowdtz, 609 A.2d at 1346 (citing Pennsylvania v. Williams, 439 A.2d 765, 768 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982) and Pennsylvania v. Rough, 418 A.2d 605 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980)) (stating that
the degree of force necessary to constitute rape depends on the particular facts of the case).
223. Berkoutiz, 609 A.2d at 1346.
224. See Pennsylvania v. Moskorison, 85 A.2d 644, 646 (Pa. 1952) (indicating that the
"additional resistance" language originated in the context of actual forcible compulsion, holding
that additional resistance is not consent, but considering a very different rape statute than
Pennsylvania's current statute).
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that no resistance is required.2" This standard is more appropriate-
ly used in contemporary cases to describe threat of, as distinguished
from actual, forcible compulsion.22  The Superior Court contended
"227that the proper focus was on the "victim's volition, yet its analysis
focused solely on the defendant's actions.22 In evaluating the
victim's volition, the court did not consider the victim's own testimony
regarding her state of mind.2" The court did not consider the
victim's testimony that she found the encounter with the defendant
"scary" or that she was in a dream-like state as reflective of her
volition.2" The court did not consider the defendant's testimony
regarding the "blank look" on the victim's face as reflective of her
volition.231 Because the victim was not "shove[d]," "pinned," nor
"imprisoned in [an] isolated area," and because the defendant did
not use his hands to restrain her, the court held that the evidence did
not demonstrate forcible compulsion." 2
The court held that it could not analyze the coercive effect of the
defendant's "leaning"33 on the victim because of the record's
failure to indicate the parties' respective sizes.2" However, the
court did not have to speculate about the coercive effect of the
defendant's actions. The court's opinion indicates that the victim
"could not move" when the defendant straddled her on the floor, and
"could not like go anywhere" when the defendant straddled her on
the bed.3 ' As a result, the opinion indicates that when assailants
are able to subdue their victims in a subtle manner, in a manner
more akin to the Justice's notions of seduction than rape, the victim's
unwillingness to be seduced will be completely irrelevant unless she
physically resists." This holding directly contradicts Pennsylvania's
225. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8107 (1983) (stating that "the alleged victim need not resist
the actor").
226. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121(2) (1983 & Supp. 1995) (indicating that today a
threat is sufficient forcible compulsion only when it would prevent a person of reasonable
resolution from resisting).
227. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1345.
228. Id. at 1346-47 (discussing that the defendant straddled the victim, attempted to have
oral sex with her, locked the door, and placed her on the bed and had sex with her).
229. d. (discussing only the defendant's physical actions and not evaluating the effect these
actions may have had on the victim's state of mind).
230. Id. at 1340-41.
231. Id. at 1341.
232. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1346-47 (focussing on the victim's knowledge that she could have
unlocked the defendant's dormitory room after he locked it).
233. Id. at 1340 ("leaning" was described earlier in the opinion as "straddling").
234. Id at 1347. (ignoring the possibility of remanding for additional findings of fact instead
of reversing the defendant's conviction).
235. Id. at 1340.
236. See Remick, supra note 4, at 1117 (asserting that women's rights to control their bodies
will not be absolute as long as force is required to prove rape).
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reform legislation which eliminates any requirement that rape victims
resist their attackers. 7
4. The Vwtim's Reiteration of the Word "No".
The final argument regarding forcible compulsion relates to the
victim's reiteration of the word "no" before and throughout the
rape.2ma The Superior Court asserted that verbal resistance was
"unquestionably relevant,"2 9 but not dispositive, in evaluating the
presence of forcible compulsion.2' Only where the victim's verbal
resistance is coupled with a threat of forcible compulsion, actual
physical force, or mental coercion, can a finding of forcible compul-
sion be upheld.2 1 The presence of aggravating factors supports a
finding of forcible compulsion.2' Aggravating factors are enumerat-
ed in Rhodes, and include age disparity, mental/physical condition,
atmosphere and physical setting, defendant's position of authority
over the victim and the victim's duress.
24s
The Superior Court found that the Berkowitz case lacked any
aggravating factors.2' Although the Superior Court believed the
victim's protests prior to penetration were sincere,24 absent any
aggravating factors, the protests alone could not establish forcible
compulsion.2' The court denounced the victim's protests during
the sexual encounter as "inconsequential" and "merely [going] to...
credibility."247
237. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (1983) (eliminating the resistance requirement); see
State Courts Struggling with Definition of Rape, DALLAS MORNING NEws,June 3,1994, atA4 (quoting
Cassandra Thomas of the National Coalition Against Sexual Assault as saying, "My concern is
that this kind of ruling will take us back to a time when you have to do something, when the
victim has to put herself in some degree of danger.").
238. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1347.
239. Id. (citing Pennsylvania v. Meadows, 553 A.2d 1006, 1009 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) and
Pennsylvania v. Dorman, 547 A.2d 757, 761 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) as discussing how courts
consider defendants' failures to listen to victims' protests).
240. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1348.
241. Id. at 1347-48 (citing Pennsylvania v. Meadows, 553 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)
where the defendant "knowingly" ignored the victim's protests as he had sexual intercourse with
her and Pennsylvania v. Dorman, 547 A.2d 757 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) where the defendant
enjoyed an authoritative position over the victim, drove her to a remote area, pushed her down
and had sex with her, despite her initial protest).
242. Berkowit., 609 A.2d at 1344 (citing Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226-27 n.16).
243. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1344 (citing Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226-27 n.15).
244. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1344 (asserting that both defendant and victim were college
sophomores, there was no evidence that their physical or mental state differed and there was
no evidence that defendant was in a position of authority over the victim).
245. Id. at 1347 n.6.
246. Id. at 1347.
247. Id. at 1347 n.6 (stating that the victim's protests during intercourse only affect the
weight of her credibility since the alleged crime occurred upon penetration).
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The Superior Court recognized that its holding can be interpreted
as requiring a victim, whose verbal resistance has failed, to physically
resist.24s The decision indicates that when a defendant proceeds to
have sexual intercourse with a victim who has said "no", the defendant
is not guilty of rape unless he becomes violent of his own accord, or
the victim resists more strenuously so as to prompt the defendant to
apply more force. Thus, the victim not only bears the burden of
communicating her nonconsent to one who is unwilling to hear, but
also of encouraging her attacker to physically assault her in a way
extrinsic to sexual intercourse.249 The court notes this departure
from legislative intent in a footnote, stating that "the 'no resistance
requirement' must be applied only to prevent any adverse inference
to be drawn against the person who, while being 'forcibly compelled'
to engage in intercourse, chooses not to physically resist."20  The
court's analysis in this regard is unsupported by the language of, and
comments appended to, Pennsylvania's Resistance Not Required
Statute. !
C. The Supreme Court
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the Superior Court's
reversal of the defendant's rape conviction stating that "in regard to
the critical issue of forcible compulsion, the complainant's testimony
is devoid of any statement which clearly or adequately describes the
use of force or threat of force against her."212  In support of its
holding, the court ignored Rhodes?5' and focused exclusively on
physical factors.M
248. Id. at 1348 n.7.
249. See RoNET BACHMAN, U.S. DEP'T OFJUsrICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: A NATIONAL
CRIME VICrIMIZATION SuRVEY REPORT 10 (1994) (reporting that in both acquaintance and
stranger rapes victims were most likely to be passive and offer only verbal resistance); Dale
Russakoff, Were Women Can'tJust Say ?'o" Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules Force is Needed to Prove
Rape, WASH. POST, June 3, 1994, at Al (quoting Kathryn Geller Myers, spokeswoman for the
Pennsylvania Coalition Against Rape, as saying the Berkowitz ruling "goes against what we've been
teaching women all these years-to say 'no', and mean 'no' and after that, any nonconsensual
sex act is rape.").
250. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1348 n.7.
251. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3107 (1983 & Supp. 1995).
252. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164; cf. ESTRICH, supra note 14, at 62-63 (criticizing rape
prosecutions as focussing too much on the victim's allegedly inadequate response); Berliner,
supra note 70, at 2694 (criticizing rape prosecutions as ignoring the defendant's real beliefs by
focusing on whether the victim's behavior would lead a reasonable person to believe she
consented and attributing that belief to the defendant).
253. 510 A.2d at 1226 (asserting that forcible compulsion is not limited to physical force and
moral, psychological, or intellectual force can constitute forcible compulsion).
254. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164 (asserting that the victim did not physically resist the
defendant's actions).
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The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion, written by Justice
Cappy,255 omits or mischaracterizes many significant facts. The
court states that the victim drank a martini and went to a lounge.2
6
The court neglects to mention that the victim's recent argument with
her boyfriend prompted her to drink in anticipation of seeing him
again and that the lounge was not in a bar but a dormitory.1 The
alcohol might have delayed the victim's response to the defen-
dant.' Such a delay could explain why she was not quick to
unlock the door or fight off the defendant.
The court also fails to mention that the victim left a note for her
friend Earl, the person she was looking for when she encountered the
defendant. u9 Omission of this fact lends credence to the defen-
dant's assertion that the victim was visiting him and detracts from the
victim's assertion that she was searching for Earl.
Although the court subsequently discusses the relevance of the
victim's verbal resistance,2 ° the court neglects to mention that the
defendant admitted that the victim said "no" throughout the encoun-
ter.21' Justice Cappy's rendition of the facts does not include the
defendant's admission that he only ceased having sexual intercourse
With the victim upon noticing a blank look on her face. 62 Neither
the Supreme Court opinion nor the Superior Court opinion mentions
that the entire attack occurred in approximately ninety seconds.2"
Such a quick attack detracts from the argument, contained in both
courts' opinions, that the victim could have opened the door and left
if she really wanted to avoid sex with the defendant." 4
255. I at 1162.
256. I at 1163.
257. Compare Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163 (stating that the victim went to a lounge) with
Berkowiut 609 A.2d at 1339 (stating that the victim drank a martini in her dormitory room).
258. BARENT F. LANDsTREET, THE DRNKNG DRIVER: THE ALCOHOL SAFETYACTION PROGRAM
18 (1977) (discussing how alcohol can lessen an individual's feelings of anxiety, apprehension
and caution); see Herbert Muskavitz & Marcelline Bums, Effects of Alcohol on Driving Performance,
14 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RESEARCH WORLD 12, 13 (1990) (stating that alcohol can delay an
individual's response time).
259. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163.
260. Compare Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164 (stating that the fact that complainant said "no" is
relevant to the issue of consent, but not to the issue of force) with Beikowitz, 609 A.2d at 1342
(stating that the victim's lack of consent is all that is relevant).
261. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1162.
262. I& at 1341.
263. Schafran, supra note 137, at 991 (citing Tr. Sept. 14, 1988 at 176 and discussing that
when a victim is sexually asaulted by someone she knows, as in Berkowitz, she may be taken off-
guard and easily overpowered without an opportunity to fight back); see Berkowi&z 609 A.2d at
1339-41 and Berkowitz 641 A.2d at 1163 (discussing the relevant facts without mentioning the
duration of the attack).
264. See Berkowitz, 609 A.2d at 1347 (concluding that there is no evidence that the victim
could not have left the room); Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164 (asserting that the victim could easily
have opened the door).
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Justice Cappy portrays the victim as incompetent. He quotes the
trial transcript wherein the victim confesses she "took no physical
action to discourage" the defendant. He states, "the record clearly
demonstrates that the door could be unlocked easily from the
inside."2" The Supreme Court noted that the victim admitted that
the defendant did not quickly shove her onto the bed and the
defendant did not restrain her with his hands." Unfortunately, the
court refused to recognize that the victim did not willingly lie down
on the bed; rather, the defendant pushed her onto the bed.2 67 The
court's focus on the encounter's physical aspects indicates that
Mlinarich,2  which limits forcible compulsion to physical force or
violence, is more reflective of the governing law than is Rhodes,26 9
which holds that forcible compulsion is not limited to physical force
nor violence.2 70
In a move further indicating the ascendance of Mlinarich to a
position of superiority over Rhodesy the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court discussed Mlinarich extensively and only briefly mentioned
Rhodes.22 Directly contradicting the Superior Court, the Supreme
Court held that the victim's repetition of the word "no" throughout
the encounter was "not relevant to the issue of force."273 The court
approvingly noted that Mlinarich held that the defendant's threat to
send the victim back to a juvenile detention home would not have
prevented resistance by a person of reasonable resolution. 4
Therefore, Mlinarich dictates that despite the victim's insistence that
she did not want to engage in sexual intercourse with the defendant,
the threat of force or psychological coercion were not present so as
to establish forcible compulsion.2 75
265. Berkoaitz, 641 A.2d at 1164.
266. Id.
267. Id.; cf Remick, supra note 4, at 1104 (noting that a certain amount of coercion,
aggression, or violence in sexual situations is accepted by society).
268. Pennsylvania v. Mlinarich, 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988).
269. 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986).
270. See Titus, 556 A.2d at 428 n.2 (quoting Mlinarich, 542 A.2d at 1342 and Rhodes, 510 A.2d
at 1225 & n.2) (discussing the differences between the two decisions).
271. Pennsylvania v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986).
272. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1163-64.
273. Berkowit, 641 A.2d at 1164. But ef. Be*oaitz, 609 A.2d at 1347 ("Evidence of verbal
resistance is unquestionably relevant in a determination of 'forcible compulsion.'").
274. Berkowaid, 641 A.2d at 1164.
275. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d at 1164-6; see ESrRICH, supra note 14, at 71 ("To reverse a conviction,
the court need only conclude that a reasonable woman's will would not have been overcome
in these circumstances, because there was no force as men understand it. The right to
seduce-the right of male sexual access in appropriate relationships-continues to be
protected.").
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IV. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO BERKOWITZ
This ruling by Pennsylvania's highest court has prompted a great
deal of commentary276 and a rush to enact new legislation eviscerat-
ing the forcible compulsion requirement. 277 Two bills are currently
pending in the Pennsylvania legislature. Senate Bill No. 533,
introduced on February 19, 1993, by Representative Greenleaf and
twelve others,279 does not eliminate Pennsylvania's forcible compul-
sion element.2 0 Rep. Greenleaf s bill does, however, add a clause
making it a first degree felony for a person sixteen years or older to
engage in sexual intercourse with a child ten years old or youn-
ger.28
1
Representative Ritter's bill, House Bill No. 160, was re-introduced
on February 1, 1993, but, unlike Greenleaf's bill, Ritter's2 2 is a
sweeping revolution of Pennsylvania's rape statute. Ritter's bill re-
defines forcible compulsion to include express or implied use of
276. Robin Abcarian, When a Woman Says 'No: Rape Conviction If Unless She is the Perfect
Victim, PHOENIX GAZETrE, June 9, 1994, at B1I (condemning the Berkowitz decision and
commenting on the disbelief of the existence of date rape); see Susan Estrich, Rape: A Question
of Force, USA TODAY, Aug. 11, 1994 at 13A (condemning the Berkowitz holding as setting a
dangerous precedent); Dave Ivey, Penrylvania Ruling Defining Rape Stirs Outcry, ARIZONA
REPUBUC, June 3, 1994, at Al (relaying that women's rights advocates consider the Berkowitz
decision a crime against women); Nancy E. Roman, Scales ofJustice Weigh Tiers of Setal Assault;
State May Reform Rape Law, WASH. TiMES,June 16, 1994 atA8 (quoting Camille Paglia, Professor
of Humanities at the University of the Arts in Philadelphia, as saying "of all the campus [rape]
cases that I have any knowledge of at all, 9 out of 10 are poppycock" and indicating that the
rape allegation in Berkowitz is similarly meritless); When Wo' Means Nothing, ST. Louis POST
DISPATCH,June 6, 1994, at B6 (quoting Debroah Zubaav of the Women's International League
for Peace and Freedom as commenting "What is it about the word 'no' (that the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court does not] understand"); Women's Groups Say No to Rape Case Ruling. Court
Decision Stirs Anger, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH,June 3, 1994, at Al (quoting Pennsylvania State
Representative Karen Ritter as arguing, "It's ridiculous to say a woman has to do more than just
say 'no,' that she has to do more than just refuse the sexual acts.").
277. See Brad Bumsted, Bill to Change Rape Law has Languished for Three Years, GANNET NEWS
SERvicE, June 10, 1994 ("A bunch of male politicians are tripping over themselves in a frenzy
to get credit for a quickly concocted bill that holds basically that 'no means no' in rape cases.
It's good politics with most voters.").
278. PA. S. 533 176th General Assembly, 1993-94 Regular Session (1993) & PA. H.R. 160,
175 General Assembly, 1993-94 Regular Session (1993); seePennsylvania Senate Rewrites Rape Law:
New Wording Would Allow Convictions Without Victim's Proof of Force, WASH. POST, June 14, 1994, at
A9 (noting that a new bill by Representative Greenleaf is facing off against an older, more
comprehensive bill, by Representative Ritter).
279. PA. S. 533, 176th General Assembly, 1993-94 Regular Session (1993).
280. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (1983 & Supp. 1995) (requiring forcible compulsion);
PA. S. 533, 176th General Assembly, 199-94 Regular Session (1993) (amending Pennsylvania's
rape law but including a forcible compulsion requirement).
281. PA. S. 533, 176th General Assembly, 1993-94 Regulalr Session (1993).
282. SeePA. H.B. 160, 175th General Assembly, 1993-94 Regular Session (1993) (recognizing
a difference between rapes involving physical violence and those without physical violence by
establishing two degrees of sexual assault).
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physical, intellectual, moral, emotional, or psychological force.28
Ritter's bill defines consent as "intelligent, informed and voluntary
affirmation not to be construed as coerced or reluctant submis-
sion."'
In addition to expanding the definitions contained in the rape
statute, Ritter's bill creates two degrees of felony sexual assault."
Section 3121(A) makes it a first degree felony to engage in a sexual
act which is accompanied by forcible compulsion and an aggravating
circumstance.286 Aggravating circumstances exist whenever the
defendant has a weapon, inflicts serious bodily injury on the victim,
commits another felony in the course of the rape, engages in a sexual
act with the victim without consent and with one or more persons,
enjoys a position of authority over the victim, or the victim is mentally
disabled or physically helpless.
287
Section 3122(A) of Representative Ritter's bill creates a second
degree felony for engaging in a sexual act which is accompanied by
forcible compulsion but which is not accompanied by an aggravating
circumstance.2 This provision, combined with the expanded
definition of forcible compulsion, ensures that defendants who are
charged with rape do not simply have a misdemeanor on their
criminal records. In addition to the felony provisions, Representative
Ritter's bill makes it a second degree misdemeanor to engage in
indecent contact with another person without consent.
28 9
Since Representative Ritter's bill languished for three years without
receiving any attention20 and rape law reformists cannot agree on
how to best change the law,29' it might be a while before Pennsylva-
283. Id. § 3101.
284. It. See Berkou*t, 609 A.2d at 1342 (noting that one of the defendant's arguments on
appeal was that forcible compulsion could not be supported by the evidence where the facts
established "reluctant submission").
285. PA. H.B. 160 § 3121; ef. ESTRICH, supra note 14, at 81 (arguing that legal definitions of
rape which use the word "assault" diminish the "unique indignity" ofrape);J.R. CHAPMAN, MA.
LARGEN AND B. SMITH, CENTER FOR WOMEN'S POLIcY STUDIES, SEXUAL ASSAULT LEGISLATION:
AN ASSESSMENT FORM THE FIELD, cited inJOEL EPSTEIN AND STAcIA LANGENBAHN, U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, THE CRIMINALJUSTICE AND COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO RAPE 13 (1994) (asserting that
convictions under a rape statute utilizing the word "assault" may be difficult because jurors may
be unwilling to impose a severe sentence on a defendant charged with assault, a term associated
with lesser offenses).
286. PA. H.B. 160 § 3121(A) (1993).
287. Id. § 3101(A).
288. It. § 3122(A).
289. Id. § 3129(A).
290. SeeBumsted, supra note 277 (noting that Ritter has worked on this bill for three years).
291. Roman, supra note 276, at A8 (pointing out differences of opinion over creating two
categories of rape, first degree felony rape and sexual assault. A charge of sexual assault only
requires the victim to prove that she did not consent, not that force was used. The women's
movement does not support such a change in the law since it suggests that acquaintence rape
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nia's rape law is reformed. The Berkowitz decision, however, may
prompt the legislature to act more quickly than it otherwise
would.292
Following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Ber-
kowitz,293 various officials and groups in the media immediately
denounced the verdict.2' Thereafter, the Berkowitz decision was
used by McKean County prosecutor CharlesJ. Duke to dismiss a rape
case against a Salvation Army official.295 In what has been dubbed
"the Salvation Army Case," 296 the prosecutor said "he had no choice
but to drop [the] charges."29  The victim in the Salvation Army
Case testified that she was riding to work with the defendant when he
stopped to pick up clothing at a Salvation Army facility.298 The
victim accepted the defendant's offer to tour the facility9 and was
standing in a hallway when the defendant emerged naked from one
of the rooms."° During the attack, the defendant used his body
weight, without hitting the victim, to force her to perform oral
sex.301 The victim verbally protested, saying "'no,' 'don't do that,'
is not as serious as rape by a stranger.); see also Guidelines Needed on Rape Laws; ST. PFTERSBURG
TImEs, June 5, 1994, at D2 (arguing that the Supreme Court should issue an opinion defining
rape which governs the entire country to further state-by-state conformity).
292. See Bumsted, supra note 277 (discussing the frenzied pace of Pennsylvania legislators
working on the rape bills).
293. 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994).
294. SeeTamar Lewin, Courts Disagree on Issue of Force in Rape, HousTON CHRoNICLE,June 5,
1994, atA16 (comparing Berowutz to Calfornia v. Inigue, 872 P.2d 1183 (Cal. 1994)); Sonya Live
(CNN television broadcastJune 9, 1994) (discussing Berkowitzwith experts and college students,
Sonya faults the victim for not taking resonsibility for her actions and doubts that the
circumstances rendered her unable to leave the room); Adrienne T. Washington, D.C. RapeLaws
Put Women in Jeopardy, WASH. Taffs, June 10, 1994, at C2 (arguing that since the District of
Columbia's rape law, like Pennsylvania's, requires force, the District could soon experience a
similar ruling); Women's Groups Say No to Rape Case Ruling Pennsylvania High Court Decision Stirs
Anger, ST. Louis Posr DISPATCHJune 3, 1994, at Al (quoting Monroe County District Attorney
James Gregor who prosecuted the case as saying "date and acquaintance rape cases probably
won't even make it to court" after the Berkowitz ruling).
295. Claude Lewis, %hen Does the Word No Mean Yes? In Rape Cases in Pennsylvania,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 27, 1994, at A9 (noting that Duke dismissed the case because
Berkowitz held that saying "no" is not enough for a rape conviction. In this case, although the
victim said "no," the accused rapist did not physically strike her and "merely" used his body
weight to force her to perform oral sex.).
296. Salvation Army Rape Case Dropped, WASH. POST, July 26, 1994, at A10 (discussing the
assault of a woman by a Salvation Army official, who told the accused rapist "no," "don't do that"
and "we can't do this," but did not physically fight with him).
297. Jeffrey Bair, Rape Case Dropped; Woman Just Said No; The Prosecutor Said He Couldn't Win,
(citing The Case of the Woman Who Lost Because She Didn't Fight, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 26,
1994, at B3).
298. Another Rape Charge Drpped, PrtSBURGH PoST-GAzgrrE, July 26, 1994, at D4.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Lewis, supra note 295, at A9 (stating that the conduct was not physically violent enough
to meet the legal requirements of rape in Pennsylvania).
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and 'we can't do this.'" ' The defendant's sixty pound weight
advantage, combined with the victim's prior back injury, precluded
her from physically resisting."0 3
The dismissal of the Salvation Army case reignited criticism of
Pennsylvania's current rape law."' If subsequent cases are dismissed
on the basis of the victim's failure to resist, Pennsylvania lawmakers
may feel increasing pressure to amend the rape law.
V. CONCLUSION
The Berkowit °' decision contradicts Pennsylvania's own prior
precedents which state that mental coercion 0 6 or force sufficient to
prevent resistance0 7 is sufficient to support a rape conviction. The
Berkowitz holding ignores the mandate that the totality of the
circumstances be reviewedo8 rather than a few, isolated facts."°
The Berkowitz decision is more in line with MlinaricP1° than
Rhodes,"' the allegedly more binding precedent.' Berkowitz, like
Mlinarich, implicitly contradicts the legislative mandate that resistance
is not required in rape prosecutions. Berkowitz also follows Mlin-
arichl 3 by indicating that the victim made a choice not to try to
open the door and leave.
If results similar to Mlinarich and Berkowitz constitute the future for
rape victims in Pennsylvania, then the future looks bleak. Justice
Larsen, author of the Rhodes opinion and apparently the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court's most progressive thinker with regard to rape, may
302. Bair, supra note 297, at B3.
303. Another Rape Charge Dropped, supra note 298, at D4 (stating that the victim's weight and
back injury left her unable to resist the defendant's actions).
304. See Another Rape Charge Dropped, supra note 298, at D4 (stating that the Pennsylvania
District Attorney's Association supports new legislation to change Pennsylvania's rape law); Bair,
supra note 297, at B3 (quoting the Prosecutor in the Salvation Army case, Charles Duke, as
asserting, "[t]he state rape law must be changed to support a woman's right to decline sex").
305. 641 A.2d 1164 (Pa. 1994).
306. See Pennsylvania v. Rhodes, 510 A.2d 1217, 1226 (Pa. 1986) (asserting that forcible
compulsion also includes moral, intellectual, or psychological force used to force a person to
engage in sexual intercourse).
307. Pennsylvania v. Irvin, 393 A.2d 1042, 1044 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (discussing how the
degree of force is defined in terms of its effect on the victim's volition).
308. Rhodes, 510 A.2d at 1226.
309. See supra section MC (discussing Justice Cappy's omission and mischaracterization of
the facts).
310. 542 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1988); see supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text (discussing how
Mlinarich limits forcible compulsion to physical force).
311. 510 A.2d 1217 (Pa. 1986).
312. Pennsylvania v. Titus, 556 A.2d 425,428 n.2. (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (asserting that Rhodes
is the law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, not Mlinarch).
313. 542 A.2d 1335, 1341-42 (Pa. 1988) (discussing how the victim made a choice between
the sexual assault and being returned to a detention home).
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never sit on the Court again." 4 Thus, Chief Justice Nix, author of
the Mlinarich opinion, faces no strong opposition to his views on rape
victims' choices."' The unanimous decision by the Supreme Court
in Berkowitz does not bode well for future rape victims.
On the other hand, Representative Karen Ritter has been working
for years to overhaul Pennsylvania's rape laws. Representative Ritter
offers hope with regard to the language and application of Pennsylva-
nia's rape statutes.316 Even if the statutory modifications she propos-
es cannot elicit the support of a majority of the legislature, she has
evinced a willingness to compromise317 and other politicians have
supported the notion of changing Pennsylvania's rape statute.318
With lawmakers scurrying to amend the law, 19 changes will hopeful-
ly begin to erode the requirement of actual physical forcible compul-
sion.
Today, Pennsylvania is at best at an impasse. The courts are bound
to follow the Berkowitz opinion and the legislature is attempting to
enact new legislation effectively overruling Berkowitz. At worst,
Pennsylvania continues to allow rapists who do not beat their victims
to rape with impunity. It is imperative that Pennsylvania reform its
rape laws so that cases like Berkowitz and the Salvation Army Case
cease to be the norm.
314. See Emilie Lounsberry, Panel Will Select Court Candidates; It Will Help Casey fill Vacancies
on the Supreme Court and Commonwealth Court, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, July 8, 1994, at B9
(asserting thatJ. Larsen was removed from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, placed on two years
probation, and ordered to perform 240 hours of community service after being found guilty of
conspiring to obtain anti-anxiety drugs); Pennsylvania Justice Charged Again, WASH. POSTJune 7,
1994, at A6 (noting thatJustice Larsen, author of the Rhodes opinion, was impeached on May
24, 1994 as a result of misconduct charges for failing to remove himself from over 20 cases
which involved his campaign treasurer from 1978 to 1992. HadJustice Larsen been present on
the bench during the Berkowitz deliberations, the result may have been different.).
315. Presumably, the five otherjustices agree withJustice Nix regarding rape victims' choices
since no dissent was filed in the Berkouditz case.
316. See Bumsted, supra note 277 (recounting Ritter's efforts to reform Pennsylvania's rape
laws).
317. Bumsted, supra note 277 (stating that Ritter is a "pragmatic politician" and will attempt
to get agreement for her main proposals).
318. Bumsted, supra note 277 (discussing that the state senate led by Senator Greenleafand
Senator Fisher are concerned that saying "no" is not enough for a rape conviction).
319. See Bumsted, supra note 277 (stating that after the Berkowitz decision, "lawmakers are
in a mad rush to fix [Pennsylvania] state law"); Roman, supra note 276 (stating that a group of
prosecutors, district attorneysjudges, state senators, andAmerican Civil Liberty Union members
support Ritter's bill and are working with her to change the current rape law in Pennsylvania).

